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outcome of a series of round-tables with major Turkish political economy experts and policy-makers as regards 
the current status and future sustainability of Turkey’s Custums Union (CU) with the EU. 
Introduction
The goal behind the present work is two-fold: on the 
one hand, it points at investigating the possible ef-
fects that the Treaty of Lisbon might have on Turkey-
EU trade relations, while on the other hand it aims to 
stimulate a theoretical debate on a topic lacking suffi-
cent attention, especially in Turkey’s academia. In fact 
the aim of the discussions held at USAK from May to 
July 2010, was to give a preliminary, and by no means 
exhaustive, answer to the following question: “How 
the new commercial policy shaped by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (ToL) would affect the CU established in 1996 
between the EU and Turkey ?”
In order to articulate a coherent argument and sum-
marize the diverse positions arisen during the round-
tables, this article tackles three relevant aspects con-
cerning the status of Turkey-EU trade relations. Firstly, 
the paper shows how the ToL  modifies and affects 
current EU trade policy. Given the high level of techni-
cality surrounding the topic, the article offers a short, 
but clear and detailed explanation of the institutional 
novelties introduced by the ToL to the EU’s trade pol-
icy. Secondly, the focus shifts to the existing institu-
tional arrangement binding Turkey to the EU trade 
policy. The nature of and the constraints posed by the 
CU are outlined in order to understand how the CU 
affects economic relations between EU and Turkey. Fi-
nally, the author articulates the main points emerged 
throughout the research-project to discuss different 
claims and perspectives on the evaluation of the im-
pact of the EU’s new trade policy on the existing CU.
The article develops through the following structure. 
In the first section, the changing nature of the EU’s 
trade policy is analyzed, stressing the gradual shift 
towards a more bilateral and Free Trade Agreements-
based (FTAs) approach, to contextualize the nature of 
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Abstract
This article analyses the European Union’s (EU) trade policy highlighting the gradual shift towards a more penetrat-
ing EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) policy and institutional changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and their 
impact on trade policy’s functioning. Emphasizing Turkey’s changing trade patterns and stressing the growing sali-
ence of non-EU trade partners, the article opens up a debate on the rationale of current Customs Union. The analysis 
brings to the understanding of the on-going cases of trade deflection negatively affecting Turkish economy and the 
drawbacks arisen from the EU’s changing FTA policy. Finally, the political and technical aspects of Turkey’s accession 
process are discussed to shed further light on the current and future meaning behind today’s Customs Union. 
the institutional changes brought about by the ToL. 
The second section provides a brief but detailed de-
scription of the funcgtioning of the EU’s trade policy, 
and afterwards focuses on the novelties introduced 
by the ToL and their impact on EU commercial policy. 
In the third section the CU’s origin, economic achieve-
ments and structural weaknesses are pointed out in 
order to outline the overall framework of Turkey-EU 
trade relations. In the fourth and final section the ten-
tative conclusions from the round-tables on the pos-
sible benefits and drawbacks of the EU’s new trade 
policy vis-à-vis the existing CU are dicussed. This part 
is originally thought to open possibilities for further 
researche among Turkish scholars to deepen the 
analysis of the current rationale behind the CU and 
to stimulate public debate on the topic. In a similar 
fashion this paper endeavours to draw the attention 
of the European scholarship on a less-known area, 
in particular for those interested in the EU’s relations 
with Turkey. 
EU’s Trade Policy Strategy 
before the Treaty of Lisbon
Until 2006 the EU has thoroughly championed a 
multilateral approach in dealing with international 
economic matters. However, the year 2006 marked a 
profound change in attitude, in line with the recon-
figuration of trade politics at global level. The shift 
experienced by the EU towards the use of bi- and 
plurilateral agreements, and the benefits arising from 
this change in paradigm, might be better understood 
by taking into account several factors. The rise in the 
economic and bargaining strength of fast-growing 
emerging markets has gradually altered power dy-
namics within multi-lateral trade fora, especially in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). As an evidence, in 
the Doha Development Round’s (DDR) outcome, the 
effort paid by the EU to include in multilateral negotia-
tions such topics as competition and investments, has 
been promptly halted by developing countries’ oppo-
sition. In open contrast with the commitment to mul-
tilateralism promoted by former Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy (1999 – 2004), under the chairmanship of 
Commissioner Peter Mendelson, the EU put forward 
a new trade outlook, as illustrated by the Communi-
cation ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’. Some 
commentators suggested (Abbott, 2008; Kutlay, 2009) 
that the most striking element of novelty of this strat-
egy was by far the emphasis on bilateral and regional 
agreements. 
According to Woolcock (2007) three main aspects had 
determined the rationale behind EU’s renewed com-
mercial interest for FTAs. First, EU-FTAs could neutral-
ize trade diversion effects brought about by the FTAs 
set up among third countries; second, FTAs would be 
viable tools to establish deeper commercial relations 
with countries experiencing rapid economic growth; 
finally, FTAs could serve as a way to enforce interna-
tional trade rules. While explaining the EU’s attitute to-
wards FTAs, Woolcock affirms that ‘[the EU] is motivat-
ed by a desire to achieve in FTAs what it has failed to 
achieve in multilateral negotiations’ (2007: 4).1 Yet the 
author further specifies the causes for the EU’s change 
in trade strategy: in particular, the failure to include 
the ‘Singapore issues’ (investment, competition, trade 
facilitation, goverment procurement) or ‘deep trade 
agenda’ (Young and Peterson 2006) into the DDA;  the 
US renewed attitude towards the use of FTAs; the in-
creased competition over emerging Asian markets 
(see Sally 2007; Kutlay 2009). As an evidence, the US 
involvement in important new markets, i.e. South-Ko-
rea, through the mean of FTA fostered a ‘growing pres-
sure for EU exporters and investors in the region for 
the EU to strengthen its presence’ (Woolcock 2007: 5). 
The 2006 Communication put emphasis on one par-
ticular feature, namely the fact that ‘the current geog-
raphy of EU FTAs mainly covers our neighbourhood 
and development objectives well, but our main trade 
interests less well’ (EU Commission, 2006: 14). Conse-
quently, the document provided the new benchmarks 
to enhance EU trade policy:
t Maintaining WTO at the centre of the interna-
tional trading system to strengthen its multilateral-
based functioning, further liberalize world trade and 
achieve the DDA objectives;
t Widening the EU’s economic scope through 
an enhanced conceptualization of FTAs. Bilateral 
agreements must regain importance to boost the 
EU’s competitiveness and deepen EU trade relations 
with emerging markets (especially Asia’s markets);
t Taking into consideration partner’s market 
potential (economic size and growth) and level of 
protection against EU exports (existence of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers) when setting up new FTAs. 
Following these criteria particular countries (South 
Korea, India and Russia) and regional blocs (ASEAN, 
1 As regard to this point, alsoYoung and Peterson (2006) 
stress how the EU is actually trying to push forward the issues 
not enforceble through multilateral cooperation via alternative 
channels, such in fact FTAs
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Mercosur, GCC) emerge as priorities. 
t Widening the areas of liberalization including 
services, investment, public procurement and com-
petition. Investment promotion and facilitation ac-
quire special importance.2 
Bearing these elements in mind, it is shown that the 
institutional changes introduced by the ToL may be 
possibly considered as the consequential step taken 
in order to address EU trade policy’s weaknesses and 
boost EU’s trade actorness. Looking at the larger pic-
ture, the EU market power has steadily decreased 
as a consequence of the rise of the developing and 
dynamic ‘Rest’ – from 1996 to 2005 in fact EU’s world 
market share has slightly diminished both in value 
and volume terms, losing respectively -1.3 and -1.7 
percentage points in market share (Trade DG 2008: 
11). On the internal side, the EU has demonstrated 
to fall short of political will and suitable measures to 
become ‘the world most dynamic knowledge-based 
economy’, as envisaged by the 2000 Lisbon Strategy3 
(Wyplosz 2010). 
Hence, the gradual switchover to a FTAs-based regime 
might be ascribed to a series of interrelated dynam-
ics. On global scale, the world economy’s recasting 
led to the decrease of EU’s global economic actorness 
and to a more general reconsideration of costs and 
benefits deriving from the thorough acceptance of a 
multilateral trading system. At EU level, these changes 
implied the restoration of trade-related postures in 
open contrast with those previously pursued. The EU 
committed to the goal of re-asserting and preserving 
its role in the world economy by maximazing the ca-
pacity to expend its range of action, both geographi-
cally and in terms of trade-areas. As a matter of fact, 
‘this relative decline in EU market power is likely to be 
2 See Evenett (2007) for a detailed account of EU trade 
policy’s evolution since 1995 and Sally (2007) to grasp EU’s shift 
towards Asia’s markets.
3 The Lisbon Agenda stemmed from March 2000 Euro-
pean Council, where EU member states agreed on a platform 
of ambitious goals aiming at coping with new challenges faced 
by the EU economy, such as her ageing population (see Gros, 
2005). Growth and jobs are in fact the main points to be further 
developed and strengthened. Research and innovation become 
the foundamental factors driving the EU towards a knowledge-
based, investment-attractive and sustainable economy. The po-
litical and economic guidelines spelled out in the Lisbon Decla-
ration also fostered the introduction of a new set of instruments, 
the so-called ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) to ensure 
better level of flexibility and implementation (João Rodrigues, 
2005). 
a factor favouring the continued use of bilateral trade 
agreements in which the EU can make more use of 
any asymmetry in economic power relative to other 
countries’ (Woolcock, 2010a: 14).  
The EU’s Trade Policy
Before the enforcement of the ToL, the Article 133 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC) ascribed the EC institutions the exclusive com-
petence to deal with EC trade policy. However, as 
Woolcock points out (2005: 379), the Commission had 
often underlined that in the areas of services, invest-
ments and intellectual properties the EC powers had 
to be further extended. Following revision treaties 
did not substantially widen Commission’s powers in 
trade policy-making. Under Article 133 (TEC) the EU 
was entitled to negotiate multilateral agreements, 
whereas Article 310 regulated the EU’s role in bilateral 
and region-to-region agreement’s negotiations. There 
were some differences between the two policy pro-
cesses involved, but both attained to the ‘Community 
method’ procedures. 
When the EU negotiated trade agreements within a 
multilateral organization, such as WTO, the Commi-
sion elaborated a draft mandate expressing the EU’s 
position on a given topic, but also mirroring mem-
ber states’ and civil society’s claims, above all interest 
groups. This draft was discussed within a Commitee of 
senior trade officials set up by Article 133 to be finally 
approved by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) by a qualified majority vote (QMV); 
however practically by consensus. Hence the Com-
mission was the only actor allowed to represent and 
put forward EU’s interest in multilateral negotiations. 
The outcome of the negotiations would have been 
adopted by the GAERC, generally again via consensus-
building. The assent of the European Parliament (EP) 
was required only if the agreement implied modifica-
tions to the existing acquis. By contrast, in bilateral or 
region-to-region negotiations the EP’s role was strog-
er because it had to grant its simple majority vote’s 
assent over any agreements. Most importantly, the 
Council decided on the final adoption of the agree-
ment through the unanimity vote. 
The ToL brought about several novelties. Yet Woolcock 
(2010; 2010a) underlines three main changes. First of 
all, the ToL clarifies the attribution of competence 
between the EU and the member states; secondly, 
it enhances the role of the EP in the EU trade policy-
making and finally it includes external trade and in-
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vestment policy in the overall frame of the European 
External Action (EEA). 
The ToL has fulfilled the task of moving all trade-relat-
ed aspects for services, intellectual property (IP) and 
foreign direct investments (FDI) under the EC exclu-
sive competence. De Quevedo Ruìz (2009: 85) in fact 
points out (see also Woolcok 2010: 22) that under the 
provision of Article 133 (TEC) there was no clear at-
tribution of competence concerning services and 
IPs between the EU and member states. As a conse-
quence the competence in those matters was shared, 
and FTAs dealing with those items were ‘mixed’ as they 
also included member states’ national competences. 
Article 207 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU) replacing the Article 133 (1) (TEC) has indeed 
extended the definition of trade policy thus granting 
the EU the exclusive competence 
…with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods 
and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken 
in the event of dumping or subsidies. 
This provision further entails the GAERC to use the 
QMV even for agreements related to services and IP, 
eliminating the unanimity vote.4 The straighforward 
consequence is faster policy-making over a wider 
range of areas in order to develop a more effective 
and inclusive trade policy. Article 207 (1) of ToL also 
casts the EU’s exclusive competence over FDI. The Ar-
ticle’s provision offers an overall framework for invest-
ment liberalization and protection,5 even tough mem-
ber states’ autonomy to establish Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) with third parties will be substantially 
curtailed. As a matter of fact, EU-BITs will gradually 
replace individual EU member states’ BITs with third 
countries, on condition that the eventual ‘EU invest-
4 However, Article 207 (4) (a) (b) underlines that the 
unanimity vote would be used by the Council for agreements 
concerning trade in cultural, audiovisual, social, education and 
health services in order to preserve EU’s cultural diversity and 
welfare provisions. This shows that the principle of ‘parallelism’ 
introduced with the Treaty of Nice (ToN) has not been overruled.
5 As Woolcock points out (2010: 24), once that FDI have 
fallen under EU exclusive competence, BITs set up by member 
states before the entrance into vigour of ToL would provide a 
case for exemption (grandfathering clause) even violating the 
relevant provision.
ment model’ will provide better terms for investors 
than the ones offered by member states. 
The ToL further strengthen the role of EP in EU trade 
policy-making. Once the co-decision mechanism has 
been defined as an ordinary legislative procedure 
(OLP), the Council and the EP, especially through the 
International Trade Committee (INTA), share the pow-
ers to set up the EU’s commercial policy. In particu-
lar, since now on INTA will have to be reported by the 
Commission about the developments during nego-
tiations, altough it does not take part in the process 
as much as the Trade Policy Committee, that actu-
ally assists the Commission throughout negotiations. 
However the EP still lacks the power to shape the ob-
jectives and authorize negotiations, but its consent 
is required for all kind of trade arrangements before 
Council’s adoption of the agreement. 
Finally, the inclusion of trade policy in the framework 
of the EU’s external action is a crucial point to start 
wondering about what role the EU will grant to trade 
in the context of its foreign policy and more generally, 
external action. To this extent, the after-ToL trade pol-
icy is closely linked with the issue of the EU’s interna-
tional actorness. According to Woolcock (2010a: 3-7) 
EU trade actorness’ attributes are: market power, in 
terms of size and market access; EU’s recognition as an 
actor independent from EU member states, especially 
via European Commission’s role in negotiations; cohe-
sion among member states in order to shape an au-
tonomous EU position; normative power, stemming 
from shared norms and standards’ ability to influence 
other actors’ decisions. Furthermore, parliamentary 
accountability over trade policy, which before the ToL 
was the least developed aspect (see also Young and 
Peterson 2006).6  If one may accurately say that the ToL 
strengthen the role of both the European Commis-
sion and the EP, more should be argued as regards the 
EU’s trade actorness and the deriving way of exercis-
ing power. It has been widely acknowledged that the 
EU’s power in international relations is based on the 
capability to constraint others’ conducts through ‘soft’ 
means excluding coercitive or military  instruments. In 
his seminal article Ian Manners (2002) defined the EU’s 
power, and therefore the EU’s peculiar kind of interna-
tional actorness, in terms of establishing ‘what passes 
as normal in international relations’, which means, the 
ability to set the normative framework influencing ac-
6 However Hagemann (2008) casts some doubts about 
the new legal framework’s ability to foster a higher degree of 
democratic accountability.
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tors’ behaviours. However, it might be misleading to 
adapt the persuasive character featuring the concept 
of ‘soft’ power (ye 1991) to the EU when it acts as a 
‘trade’ power (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005). Assuming 
that the changes set up by the ToL magnified the EU’s 
trade actorness, would not automatically imply the in-
crease in the EU’s power to shape the rule of the glob-
al trade-system. Rather, it might be argued that once 
defined the conditions for the EU to re-emerge as a 
leading trade actor, the mechanisms of conditionality 
entailed in the FTAs would acquire further relevance 
as the crucial element to address others’ behaviour in 
line with the EU’s expectations. Conditionality is in fact 
the tool that the EU uses to transform its economic 
power, into the leverage capable of shaping others’ 
actions, thus exercising its power ‘through’ the chan-
nel of trade. 
Such a consideration may be tested in the case of 
the EU’s CU with Turkey. The question of horizontal 
coherence across different EU external policy areas, 
i.e. trade and enlargement, it is in fact the key to 
understand what kind of effects the post-ToL EU’s 
trade policy is likely to produce vis-à-vis Turkey’s 
accession process. More specifically, how will the 
EU’s new trade strategy affect existing trade agree-
ments, such as the CU established with Turkey in 
1995?
The EU-Turkey Customs Union 
In 1963 the Association Agreement between the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, 
the so called ‘Ankara Treaty’, was signed envisaging 
three main points: the creation of a CU between the 
EEC and Turkey; free mobility of labour; and eventu-
ally Turkey’s ECC full membership (Article 28 of the 
Treaty). Those goals had to be achieved through a 
three-phase process consisting of a 5-year ‘prepara-
tory stage’ when the EEC provided Turkey with eco-
nomic assistance in order to smooth the passage 
to  the ‘transitional stage’ to finalize the Customs 
Union. In 1973 the ‘Additional Protocol’ modified 
the Ankara Treaty and outlined 1996 as the dead-
line to achieve the CU. The Additional Protocol en-
tailed a remarkable reduction of EC protectionist 
barriers for Turkish industrial goods (textile exclud-
ed). Likewise Turkey agreed on lowering tariffs and 
quotas on EEC exports (Öniş 2001). The ‘final phase’ 
would have established the CU; however, owing to 
the growing political instability and Turkey’s debt 
crisis, in 1977 Turkey freezed Additional Protocol’s 
provisions and unilaterally stopped customs lower-
ing.7  
The 1980 ‘January 24 Decision’ for economic stabiliza-
tion and liberalization had the objective to align Turk-
ish economy with the changing European economic 
environment. The economic reforms contained in the 
programme, which ushered Turkey into its first phase of 
economic liberalization (1980-1989), soon produced the 
desired outcomes. Macroeconomic adjustments were 
mainly oriented to promote exports and gradually liber-
alize imports, along with the deregulations of exchange 
rate and capital movements. Inflation lowered to 35-40% 
from the three-digit rate of the previous years, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average of 
5.8% without recession. During the same period, follow-
ing the liberalization of trade and financial markets, the 
export-GDP ratio trebled, shifting from 4.1% to 13.3%. 
However, in this phase foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flow was still unremarkable, thereby similarly to the Greek 
case we cannot speak of investment-led growth. After the 
abolishment of the ‘Law for the Protection of the Value 
of the Lira’ in 1984 foreign exchange regime and capital 
movements were also liberalized. As a result, along with 
the steady depreciation of Turkish Lira (TL) short-term 
money markets were established and the whole domes-
tic financial market vigorously stepped into the global 
financial system (Ertuğrul and Selcuk, 2001). During that 
period the role of the state as an economic actor, both in-
vestor and producer, was dramatically curtailed through 
an intense process of privatization affecting the so-called 
‘state economic enterprises’ (SEEs). However, wages were 
constantly eroded by this combination of privatization 
and restrictive policies. As Mütfüler (1995) shows, struc-
tural adjustments carried on throughout the 1980s had 
the goal to offset European economic integration’s ef-
fects over Turkish economy. Non-tariff barriers’ removal 
and Southern countries’ new membership further maxi-
mized EC market integration at the expense of Turkey’s 
welfare gains. Freer circulation of productive factors mag-
nified intra-EC trade, in particular thanks to the fact that 
the rest of the EC achieved free access to new EC-mem-
bers dynamic markets. Thus far Turkey’s external trade 
was dominated by the EC: imports and exports absolute 
volume steadily increased, however Turkey’s shares of im-
7 Turkey in fact faced a steep balance of payment’s wors-
ening due to the considerable foreign reserves’ outflows used to 
pay energy bills after the 1973-74 oil-shock. Stagflation further 
decreased EEC’s demand for Turkish manufactures, thus foster-
ing industrial recession. Ecevit’s expansionary monetary policy 
meant to boost economy but in fact just helped inflation to spiral 
(Zürcher, 2007). 
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ports from the EC started to boost since the second half 
of the 1980s, as a result of improved macro-economic 
conditions. Contrarely, Turkey’s share of exports to EC be-
tween 1985 and 1988 went sharply above and below the 
average of 45% respectively (see Table 1 and 2). It is then 
arguable that Common External Tariff’s (CET) imposition 
in the new members’ markets increased intra-EC trade at 
1995, one year after the establishment of the CU. The ef-
fect of trade liberalization and the growing productive 
specialization helped Turkish export-industry to con-
the expense of Turkish goods’ competitiveness in the Eu-
ropean markets. Nonetheless, Turkey’s competitiveness 
problem may also be explained looking at Turkey’s spe-
cialization in lower value-added goods, such as textile, 
iron and steel. However, on a longer time-frame, Turkey’s 
exports grew rapidly at an annual rate of 17.2%, while the 
export/GDP ratio shifted from 4,1% in 1980 to 12,8% in 
centrate on the manufacturing sector, which in fact 
began to cover a higher share of the overall exports 
(see Table 3). Between 1980-1990 the manufacturing 
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Table 1
Table 2
Source: Mütfüler, Meltem (1995), “Turkish Economy Liberalization and European Integration”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (19), January 1995, 85-98; p. 89. 
Source: Mütfüler, Meltem (1995), “Turkish Economy Liberalization and European Integration”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (19), January 1995, 85-98; p. 89. 
sector grew by 7.9% annually, while in the following 
decade its growth reached 5.9% (World Bank 2000).  
Through this process Turkey not only reduced its im-
port tariffs, mainly on EC goods, from 10% to 60% in 
six years (1988-1994) in order to align with CET, but 
it also experienced a economic growth, boosting Tur-
growth was 4.2% (World Bank 2000; OECD 2010). Fur-
ther reforms aimed at restructuring the bank-system 
and financial sector, for the TL’s exchange rate to be 
market-determined. In 1989 currency full-convertibil-
ity was also established. On the external dimension, 
financial reforms eased capital inflows and outflows, 
while on the internal side interest rates and credit-
issuing were totally liberalized. However, no adequate 
financial istitutions have been set up in order to su-
pervise the whole transition, consequently fuelling a 
dramatic increase of corruption  (Öniş 2004). 
To sum up, throughtout the 1980s Turkey actively 
shifted from an import-substitution to an export-
oriented economy, maintaining the EC as the main 
trade partner. However, it is not accurate to speak 
key’s GDP from $128 billion in 1980 to $322,1 billion in 
1990 and doubling the international trade share over 
the whole GDP. In terms of annual growth, during the 
same time-span Turkish GDP increased annualy by the 
average rate of 5.4%. The outcome was less satisfac-
tory in the following decade, when the average GDP 
of a proper ‘growth effect’ deriving from the ‘January 
24 Decision’. Despite stable GDP growth rate, capital 
accumulation was undermined by high volatility of 
financial markets and even higher levels of inflation. 
Restrictive monetary policies further curtailed rooms 
for human capital accumulation. Indeed, the Turkish 
case in 1980s-1990s has been defined as the classic 
example of ‘boom-bust’ economy (Ertuğrul and Selcuk 
2001): better investment conditions certainly favoured 
physical capital accumulation, thereby prompting 
medium-term growth effects; however less focus on 
human and knowledge capital undermined long-
term growth effects (see Baldwin & Wyplozs, 2009). 
The combination of these factors in Turkish economy 
meant cyclical current account inbalance leading to 
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Table 3
Table 4
Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), “Trade and 
Competitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 5. 
Source: IFM; adapted by the author. 
financial volatility, especially throughout the second 
phase of liberalization (1989-1995) (see tables 4 and 
5). The years before the establishment of the CU were 
marked by high level of inflation and external deficit 
(see figures 1). However, the decisive impulse to fos-
ter EC-Turkey integration came from politics. In 1989 
the EC rejected 1987 Turkey’s application for member-
ship. This event shifted Turkish policy-makers’ atten-
tion towards the creation of a customs union, which 
was not seen as a mere alternative but as a crucial 
step towards full-fledged membership. During the 
1990s party fragmentation led to the emergence of 
Necmettin Erbakan’s islamist Welfare Party (WP) at the 
expense of the more secular True Path Party’s (TPP) 
leadership. Hence, most prominent TPP figure Tansu 
Çiller used the rise of political Islam as a scapegoat to 
trigger the CU’s establishment. She in fact argued that 
the CU’s failure, broadly meaning the impossibility to 
join the EC, was likely to gradually transform Turkey 
into an Islamist regime, whereas a firm commitment 
from the EC would have preserved the country’s 
secular and Western-oriented tradition (Mütfüler-Bac 
1998). The Association Council Decision N. 1/95, bet-
ter known as ‘1995 Agreement’, implied for Turkey a 
‘substantial alignment of regulatory regimes’ (Ülgen 
and Zahariadis 2004). In particular the CU required: 1) 
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Table 5
Figure 1
Sources: Eurostat; in Gros, D. (2005), “Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership”, CEPS Policy Brief, 69, 
April 2005, 1-10, p. 3. The author makes a comparison with Spain’s economy, which became an EU’s new member 
when Turkey lodged its application for full-membership, so as to demonstrate the different patterns of economic 
integration between EU members and non-members. 
Sources: Ertoğrul, A. & F. Selçuk (2001), “A Brief Account of Turkish Economy, 1980 – 
2000”, in Russian and East European Finance and Trade, pp. 1 – 27; p. 2. 
Sources: Ertoğrul, A. & F. Selçuk (2001), “A 
Brief Account of Turkish Economy, 1980 
– 2000”, in Russian and East European 
Finance and Trade, pp. 1 – 27; p. 8
bilateral removal of industrial tariffs, a process started 
with the Additional Protocol consisting of customs 
duties’ complete elimination; 2i) the harmonization of 
Turkey’s external industrial tariff with the CET on im-
ports from third countries (an average of 3%) under 
the provision of Article 16; 3) adoption of the acquis 
communautaire in the matter of TBT’s elimination, 
the EU and trade partners and implementing their 
provisions, including IPs. Thtough this the CU deep-
ened the extent of economic integration between the 
EU and Turkey both in terms of legislative harmoniza-
tion and trade volume.  The implementation of the CU 
certainly impacted Turkish economy, both in terms of 
foreign trade and EC-Turkey trade. On the import side, 
in the year of the inception of the CU, Turkey’s over-
all imports raised by 22,2%, but in terms of imports 
from the EC the increase was by 37,2%. However, 
these figures decreased sharply in the following years, 
mostly due to the 1998-99 financial turmoil caused by 
the crises in Russia and Southeast Asia. In the period 
of 1995–2002 the average share of imports coming 
from the EU was around 49,3%, but the pattern was 
highly uneven: in 2001 for instance Turkey’s imports 
from Europe accounted only for 44,2% of the total. On 
the export side, Turkey traded on average with the EU 
the 50,7% of its total exports, especially in 1998 and in 
the 2000s (see table 6). The establishment of the CU 
proved to be more beneficial for Turkey in terms of in-
creasing imports rather than exports, thus augment-
ing Turkey’s foreign debt deficit with the EU. However, 
under the CU regime the EU positively remained Tur-
key’s major trade partner. 
EU-Turkey external trade volume in the period 1999-
2008 experienced an almost steady increasing trend, 
protection of competition— in 1995 in fact Turkey de-
veloped its own competition laws on the EU model— 
administration of border procedures, rules of origins, 
protection of commercial, industrial and intellectual 
property rights; 4) under the provision of Article 54, 
the adoption of EU’s commercial policy towards third 
countries, which means accepting all FTAs between 
amounting to €93.463 million in the last year (Eurostat 
2010). In 1999 Turkey’s share of imports coming from 
the EU was 55.41%. However, interestingly enough in 
the period 2001-2010 EU’s share of Turkey’s total trade 
volume started to decline from 53,63% in 2003 to 
42,29% in 2010. This downturn cannot be explained 
only through the recent economic crisis because the 
declining share of trade towards EU countries began 
when Turkey’s imports and exports were still boom-
ing. On the other hand, Turkey has become the EU’s 
seventh biggest imports partner accounting for 3.0% 
of the EU’s total imports and the fifth major export 
partner receiving the 4.1% of the EU’s exports (Europe-
an Commission 2008). Is it then arguable that Turkey’s 
economy is highly integrated with the EU’s economy? 
Should this assumption be posed under review? The 
EU’s economy is surely more dependent on the US, 
China, Russia and EFTA members, especially Norway 
and Switzerland, than on Turkey. However, in the pe-
riod of 2001-2010 it is acknowledged that also Turkey 
started to gradually diversify its trade patterns: Middle 
Eastern and Asian countries have attracted the bulk of 
Turkey’s import-export shares showing a clearly rising 
trend. As a combined effect of the 2008 financial crisis 
and Turkey’s trade patterns diversification, total trade 
between Turkey and the EU dropped from $138,193 
million in 2008 to $37,605 million in 2010 (see Table 7). 
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Table 6
Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), “Trade and Com-
petitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 6. 
Turkey’s trade diversification may be understood tak-
ing into account several factors. Regions of the Black 
Sea, the Caspian Sea and the whole Greater Middle East 
adquired more importance in global trade, and Turkey, 
due to its peculiar geographical position, may foster a 
pivotal role in the region. A clear sign of such an inten-
tion may be seen nowadays as regard to energy supply, 
where Turkey is acting to become the ‘energy-corridor’ 
bringing hydrocarbons directly to European markets 
(Tekin and Williams 2009; 2009a). Despite the fact that 
the EU is still the main commercial partner, Turkey’s cen-
trality within countries with abundant energy resourc-
es, dynamic economies and growing internal demands 
seems to set the basis for an on-going economic up-
grade. Turkey’s efforts to strengthen trade parternship 
and establish new cooperation agreements with its 
neighbourhood spells out a certain interest in becom-
ing a major hub in the region. In the meanwhile, trade 
patterns’ diversification would increase Turkey’s gains 
in terms of volume trade, specialization and export-led 
economic growth. In the light of what has been set up 
as the new Turkish foreign policy doctrine,8 becoming 
a regional hub for trade and energy would increase 
Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the EU, as the membership does 
not seem a sudden alternative. 
According to the official data in April 2010 in fact ex-
port to the Near and Middle East covered the 19,3% of 
Turkey’s total export, while the 8,2% has been traded 
with other Asian countries. The Organization of Black 
8 The concept of “Strategic Depth” created by the current 
Fpreign Minister Ahmnet Davutiglu is based on the assumption 
that Turkey must gain a primary role in world affairs (“centrality”) 
due to its historical legaly and geographical location. One of the 
means to realize this aim is in fact trade relations.
Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC) amounts to the 
13% of Turkey’s total exports. On the import side al-
most 30% of Turkey’s imports come from the Asian 
continent, almost 40% from OBSEC and former Sovier 
Republics, while almost 14,4% originates from Middle 
Eastern and South-East Asian countries grouped within 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Turkey’s 
Undersecretary of the prime Ministry for Foreign Trade 
2009). 
One of the key issue in the debate about the future 
sustanability of the CU agreement deals with agricul-
ture. Although the CU set up the basis for deeper in-
tegration towards Turkey’s full membership,  a crucial 
sector for Turkish economy such as agriculture has not 
yet been included in the arrangement. Despite the 
declining weight of agriculture in Turkish economy, 
in 2007 this sector still employed 26% of Turkish la-
bour force accounting for 9% of the GDP (see Table 8). 
Turkey’s eventual membership would widen the EU’s 
agricultural area of 39 million hectares. Turkey in fact 
is a major agricultural producer and net exporter: in 
2007 its cereal production equaled 11.4% of the EU’s 
production, fruit and vegetables equaled 60%. Given 
these data it is possible to understand the EU’s reluc-
tance to fully liberalize agriculture. Albeit Common 
Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) new logic has moved price 
floors to market-determined prices compensating 
farmers’ losses with direct payments, if Turkish agricul-
tural products were fully liberalized within the context 
of the CU, market prices would reach a lower equilib-
rium level and the EU’s reimbursements to farmers 
would sharply increase. However, it is worth noting 
that the bulk of agricultural trade between the EU and 
Turkey already abides with preferential trade rules and 
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Table 7
Source: Turkstat
it is mostly liberalized (Grethe 2003: 27), although no 
fixed timetable is scheduled to thoroughly include 
agriculture in the CU. In case of its full inclusion in 
the CU framework, Turkey would be constrained 
to lower its prices in accordance with the WTO-led 
trend pushing towards the liberalization of agricul-
tural goods. This in turn would affect negatively the 
welfare gains of Turkish farmers, already in a disad-
vantaged position because mostly concentrated 
in the poorest areas. Lowering of the agricultural 
prices would increase the need to support produc-
ers through export subsidies, administered prices 
and direct payments. The ongoing liberalization of 
agricultural good in fact has already affected Tur-
key in this sense. In 1998 only producer support in 
Turkey cost € 9 million, while in 2000 the 86% was 
granted as price support, creating sharp distortion 
effects (Grethe 2003: 29). 
Thus far, Turkey has benefited from the CU as long 
as this arrangement provided the framework to 
gradually shape Turkey’s trade legislation on the 
acquis bases. Legislative harmonization, alignment 
with CET and adoption of FTAs set up by the EU 
clearly increased Turkey’s access to third countries’ 
markets. Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) ar-
gue that acting simoultaneously on the ‘internal’ 
sphere, i.e. the CU, and the ‘external’ dimension, i.e. 
tariff reduction with third countries, would reduce 
‘trade diversion’ effects. As a matter of fact Ülgen 
and Zahariadis (2004: 21) state that ‘stronger bilat-
eral trade has thus been accompanied by stronger 
trade growth overall [for Turkey]’ . Indeed Harri-
son, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) calculated Turkey’s 
gains from bilateral liberalization as recurring and 
accounting for 1-1.5% of the GDP. However they 
outlined revenue replacement as a big challenge. 
Since Turkey would be likely to lose around 1.4% of 
the GDP from tariffs reduction, fiscal deficit should 
not be increased in order to offset the loss. Reduc-
ing export subsidies applied to trade with third 
countries is an important measure in order to both 
diminuish distortion effects and alleviate the bur-
den on fiscal deficit. In addittion Zahariadis (2004 
in Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004) estimates that har-
monization with EU technical regulations and abo-
lition of technical barriers would account for 1.5% 
of the GDP. 
As substantial tariff reduction implies an imports 
increase, currency depreciation is needed to boost 
exports and keep the current account in balance. 
In the Turkish case acting on the exchange rate has 
often spiralled inflation. However, given the exclu-
sion of agriculture from the CU arrangement and 
Turkey’s maintainance of relatively higher tariff, the 
agricultural sector ended up being a more protect-
ed sector. This led in turn to increase the assymetry 
of the integration depth within the CU, with nega-
tive effects for Turkey. As a matter of fact, in order to 
balance different exports level between the indus-
trial and the agricultural sectors Turkey would have 
to subsidize agricultural goods boosting exports 
in an inefficient way and negatively affecting fiscal 
deficit. Therefore the asymmetric nature of the CU 
posed some problems that should be addressed 
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Table 8
Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), 
“Trade and Competitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 6. 
* Usable agricultural area (UAA); *** 2006 data.
fostering widening and deepening measures. 
In addittion, the CU has also produced several 
drawbacks. To start with,  the CU’s main weakness 
seems to be the lack of cooperation and consulta-
tion between the two parties in dealing with com-
mercial policy’s choices, since Turkey has actually 
no say on EU external trade policy. This in turn has 
led to inconsistency between the EU and Turkey 
trade policy. After 1996 and especially following 
the 2006 EU’ change in trade policy strategy, Ülgen 
and Zahariadis (2004: 26) stress that
The EU went ahead and concluded these agreements 
[FTAs with third countries] without actually taking 
into consideration the existence of a custom union 
arrangement with Turkey. As such, there were no prior 
consultations with Turkey and therefore Turkish con-
cerns did not come into play during the negotiations. 
Yet, because of the custom union arrangement, Tur-
key was forced to conclude a similar agreement with 
those countries after the EU did. 
This phenomenon is seen as the origin of a high-
ly detrimental situation for Turkey. The EU’s trade 
partners have proved very often to be unwilling to 
negotiate with Turkey because via FTA’s establish-
ment with the EU and in virtue of EU-Turkey CU, 
they were able to export tariff-free goods also to 
the Turkish markets. By contrast, since the prefer-
ential agreement just included goods originating 
from the EU, they were not bound to lower their 
tariffs vis-à-vis Turkish goods. To this extent, EU-
Turkey CU created a typical case of ‘trade deflec-
tion’. Implications for Turkey were, firstly the fact 
that Turkish exporters found themselves in disad-
vantage as regards the EU’s exporters towards third 
countries as Turkish goods did not fall within the 
preferential agreement; secondly the loss of poten-
tial tariff revenues from goods coming from third 
countries who entered the Turkish market via EU 
(Kutlay 2009: 127). 
The second drawback is that several areas are still 
not included in the CU. Besides the ‘in-between’ 
case of agriculture, liberalization of trade in ser-
vices could have a strong impact on productivity 
and competitiveness of Turkey’s service sector and 
furthermore, it would curtail state involvement in 
economic activities, ensure regulatory policy con-
vergence and improve economic governance. In 
addition, since Turkish economy is rapidly shifting 
towards a service-led economy— service’s share 
of total GVA raised from 53.4% in 1998 to 64.4% in 
2008 (Eurostat 2010)— the liberalization of this sec-
tor could further improve CU parties’ mutual gains 
in terms of efficiency and lower prices. However EU 
members’ fear for ‘social dumping’, yet magnified 
by the latest enlargement, is likely to deny Turkish 
enterprises the right to settle and eventually bring 
their labour force to the EU. 
On Turkish side, the ‘implementation problem’, 
namely the insufficient and inadequate applica-
tion of norms and standards, also concerns techni-
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Table 9
Source: TurkStat
cal regulations, with the result that some indus-
trial goods categories heavily imported by the 
EU such as cars, chemicals and foodstuff, still do 
not fit with the standards. Trade flows then be-
come slower, with obvious welfare losses (Bary-
sch, 2005). Moreover, increasing current-account 
deficit, huge public debt and lower employment 
rate undermine Turkey’s ability to attract FDI, es-
pecially long-term inflows (see Table 9).
to widen the CU also liberalizing the service sec-
tor, the EP would be asked to grant its assent and 
via INTA it will be constantly updated about nego-
tiations’ outcomes. However, it would not be able 
to determine Commission’s choice of whether or 
not to widen the CU, but it will share the decision-
making power with the Council to eventually 
adopt the act. 
By contrast, the division of competence between 
EU and member states would have major reper-
cussions. Since new crucial areas have been in-
cluded under the umbrella of the EU;s exclusive 
competence, member states have agreed on 
yielding part of their trade policy’s autonomy to 
the Commission, thus enormously widening its 
power of initiative. Trade-related aspects of servic-
es, FDI and IPs are in fact the furthest challenges to 
international trade liberalization, given their grow-
ing weight 
The CU and the ToL
In order to understand what kind of implication 
the ToL could have on the EU-Turkey CU two fac-
tors should be taken into account. First, the likely 
institutional changes of the ToL affecting the EU 
trade policy and consequently the existing CU. 
Second, ToL novelties, interacting with global 
trade dynamics that may re-shape EU trade actor-
ness. With the ToL the EU has achieved institution-
al channels which widen and strengthen EU trade 
policy’s scope of action. Despite its importance 
insofar as EU legitimacy is concerned, it might be 
said that the increased role of the EP is not likely to 
determine EU-Turkey CU economic improvements 
or worsening. Rather, as the EP mirrors European 
society’s claims it would work as catalyst or obsta-
cle when time to deepen the EU’s relations with 
Turkey will be ripen. For instance, if the EU decided 
on national GDPs, the global shift towards tech-
nology and knowledge-based economy and their 
technical and legislative complexity. EU members 
decided to maximize their individual strength in 
bilateral as well as in multilateral negotiations  act-
ing collectively within the EU bloc. The obvious re-
sult might be two-fold: the Commission’s compe-
tence in trade policy has been extended in order 
to pursue a more coherent, encompassing and far-
reaching trade policy, and this may strengthen the 
EU in multilateral and bilateral negotiations; as a 
result, the overall EU’s capability to act as an inde-
pendent and assertive actor in international trade 
may be enhanced. Being empowered with the 
competence to include all the aspects concerning 
trade and trade liberalization in the globalization 
era, the EU would be able to exploit the compara-
tive advantage created by high added value and 
technological goods, knowledge, information and 
IT economies, highly developed human capital 
formation and accumulation. 
A possible scenario might occurr if and when the 
EU would apply the ToL’s provision related to trade 
policy within the context of the CU with Turkey. 
In this case the existing arrangement would be 
widened and deepened to a new dimension of 
trade integration between Turkey and the EU. In 
spite of macroeconomic constraints and struc-
tural asymmetries, such as agricultural sector’s rel-
evance, state-dominated enterprises and low lev-
el of competition enforcement, Turkish economy 
has proved to be dynamic and onward-oriented. 
Service, especially communication and transport, 
is a fast developing sector which is expected to 
become Turkish economy’s engine. As shown 
above, service liberalization between the EU and 
Turkey could push down prices as a result of the 
increased competition, thus augmenting net con-
sumers welfare gains and maximizing efficiency 
for producers. In the case of a more integrated CU, 
Turkish market will benefits not only in quantita-
tive terms, but also to the extent of stability and 
reliability. Hence, foreign agents would be more 
prone to invest in Turkey thus increasing long-
term FDI inflows. Under Article 207 (1) the EU will 
liberalize FDI while protecting EU investors, thus 
creating a mutually beneficial framework to en-
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sure a safe investment-environment and boost 
economy. Turkey, who still attracts a relatively low 
portion of FDI given its market size, will be directly 
favoured by this provision. To sum up, if applied 
to the existing arrangement the novelties brought 
about by the ToL could start up the CU on new, 
more dynamic and more challanging basis. 
However, the most thought-provoking point 
might depend on the EU future trends in trade 
policy. Once acknowledged that ToL reforms’ goal 
is to grant to the EU the capability to act as a more 
visible, coherent and effective trade actor, what 
is important to understand is how and in which 
direction the EU will carry on its trade policy. To 
this extent, it is still unclear whether the dynam-
ics taking place at global level, i.e. economic re-
gionalization vs. multilateralism, are likely to have 
a stronger impact than internal preferences, i.e. 
switchover to bilateral FTA/PTA-based regimes. 
Some authors (Abbott 2008; Kutlay 2009; Martin 
et al 2010), without putting into question the lib-
eralization trend undergone by global trade, have 
argued that multilateral liberalization has expe-
rienced a sharp decline favouring the flourish-
ing of FTAs. As it was shown above, also the EU 
since 2006 has underpinned its trade strategy to 
this logic bypassing the multilateral praxis. This 
shift is likely to hold for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, the crisis in Greece has prompted an 
escalation of panic throughout the EU and global 
markets (Nye, 2010), laying bare Economic Mon-
etary Union (EMU) structural asymmetries and 
Euroland’s currency vulnerability (Ito 2010; Rodrik 
2010). The EU has to find a way to reaffirm itself 
in the international trade arena,9 not only to sus-
tain welfare gains achieved so far but also to re-
state its primary legitimacy source, i.e. economic 
strength.  On the other hand, the EU is still one 
of the most important global economic actors, 
and the size and specialization of its economy can 
produce better trade-offs when it acts on bilateral 
or regional basis. In sum, it seems that the EU has 
9 For instance, Lady Catherine Ashton’s appointment 
as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who was in fact former EU Trade Commissioner 
is highly indicative of EU’s eagerness to point out trade as EU 
external action’s cornerstone.
started to grant much more value to the net gains 
achievable through FTAs rather than the ones pro-
vided by multilateral arrangements, mainly within 
the WTO rounds, regardless distortion effects em-
anating from the discriminatory character of each 
preferential agreements. 
Should the EU  keep pursuing its trade liberaliza-
tion agenda, now including also services, IPs and 
FDI, by favouring bilateral arrangements, Turkey’s 
gains from the current CU would be unequally dis-
tributed. Assuming that the EU carries on nego-
tiations in order to liberalize trade in services, FDI 
and IPs within the context of the CU, when the EU 
would set up the FTAs with third countries dealing 
with the same contents, the ‘trade deflection’ sce-
nario valid for industrial goods woud appear again 
in Turkey’s detriment. Furthermore, if the EU would 
decide not to extend service, IPs and FDI liberaliza-
tion to the CU with Turkey, distortion effects aris-
ing from preferential agreements between a world 
major trade bloc and highly dynamic economies 
on fast growing and gainful sectors would be 
likely to undermine Turkey’s global competitive-
ness and reduce its capability to penetrate new 
markets.10 Moreover, the practice of ‘shadowing’ 
the EU;s FTAs policy, being the only viable solu-
tion to offset the diversion and deflection effects, 
has proved to be costly. First, the bureacratic cost 
of initiating and maintaining separate negotia-
tion in order to settle a final agreement. Second, 
often the lack of willingness of the third party to 
negotiate with Turkey a FTA mirroring that estab-
lished with the EU. Needless to say, the outcome 
of this long-lasting and resource-draining process, 
is by no means secure. The inclusion of the ‘Turk-
ish clause’, requiring the third party to sign a simi-
lar FTA with Turkey, is an appropriate step to share 
this burden. Also, the fact that Turkey is compelled 
to undertake further efforts in order to counter-
balance the effects of the unilaterally decided EU 
trade policy, from the Turkish standpoint, is the 
result of the highly asimmetrical nature of the CU. 
10 However, as Kirişci (2009) points out, Turkey has started 
to pursue a more active ‘trade diplomacy’ in order to follow EU 
external trade policy and too sign bilateral preferential agree-
ments with EU’s new trade partners (see also Kutlay, 2009). This 
practice of ‘shadowing EU’s FTA policy’ has been for long carried 
on by EFTA (Baldwin & Wyplozs, 2009: 461).
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Status  of  Preferential  Trade  Agreements  (PTAs)  of  EU  and  Turkey  in  Comparative  Perspective
EU Turkey
Country Starting  Date  of  Negotiation
Signature  Date  of  the  
Agreement
Starting  Date  of  
Negotiation
Signature  Date  of  the  
Agreement
Isreal 1995 1995 1994 1996
EFTA
Countries 1990 1992 1990 1991
Croatia 2000 2001 2000 2002
Bosnia-­Herzegovina 2000 2007  (initialized) 2002 2002
Serbia 2005 2007 2007 continuing
Montenegro 1996 2006 2007 continuing
Morocco 1995 1995 1999 2004
Tunisia 1995 1995 2002 2004
Palestine 1995 1997 1999 2004
Syria 1995 2004(initialized) 2004 2004
Egypt 1995 2001 1998 2005
Albania 2000 2006 2003 2006
Jordan 1995 1997 2005 continuing
Lebanon 1995 2002 2003 continuing
South  Africa  Republic 1995 1999 2004(exploratory  talks) continuing
Algeria 1995 2001 Not  started March  2010  JEC*
Faeroe  Islands -­ 1991 2000 continuing
ACP  countries 1998 2000 Not  started -­
Mexico 1996 2000 Not  started -­
Mercosur April  2000 continuing June  2008(exploratory  talks)
-­
GCC 1990 continuing November  2005 continuing
Ukraine April  2008 continuing June  2007(exploratory  talks) -­
India June  2007 continuing February  2008(attempt) -­
Chile 2000 2002 March  2008 July  2009
South  Korea May  2007 October  2009 January  2008(attempt) -­
ASEAN May  2007 continuing June  2007(attempt) -­
Central  America September  2007(exploratory  talks)
April  2008
(I  round) Not  started -­
Andean  Community September  2007
(exploratory  talks)
April  2008
(I  round) Not  started -­
Pakistan -­ -­ November  2009 March  2010  MoUs**
Iran 2002 stalled 2007 April  2009
Table 10
Source: Kutlay, M. (2009), “The Changing Policy of the European Union towards Free Trade Agreements and its Effects on Turkish 
Foreign Trade: A Political Economy Perspective”, USAK Yearbook, 2, 117-132, p. 127.
* Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ** Memoranda of Understanding on economic cooperation, agriculture and investments
Conclusion
From the EU’s perspective, the institutional channels 
opened by the ToL are likely to strengthen the Com-
mission’s ability to cast a more coherent and inclusive 
trade policy, which in turn might be able to shape a 
more assertive and credible role as an autonomous 
actor in the international trade arena. Given current 
patterns of trade globalization, the high volatile nature 
of the international financial system and the growing 
intra-systemic asymmetry, multilateral arrangements 
seem harder to achieve and less attractive in terms of 
the immediate gains and positive outcomes. Thus, it 
is arguable that the FTAs will continue to be the most 
used trade arrangements insofar as trade liberaliza-
tion on wider and wider sectors is concerned. 
In this context, the EU-Turkey CU looks more like a li-
ability, rather than an assett. Comparing economic 
advantages that the EU would achieve under ToL pro-
vision as regards trade policy, and by contrast the det-
rimental situation that Turkey may face, it seems obvi-
ous that the ‘in-between’ solution offered via CU is not 
satisfying. Turkey is by far a rising international actor 
whose power is less and less based on its traditional 
military strength; economic relations and commercial 
ties have spread throughout its entire neighbouring 
area. The geography of Turkey’s economic actorness 
is radically changing: at the time of CU establishment 
Turkey was in fact exclusively dependent on the trade 
flows with the EC, while nowadays trade patterns have 
widened and diversified to great extent. A highly inter-
esting point is that Turkey’s share of market oriented 
to countries having just a marginal impact on the EU’s 
economy, such as Iran or Central Asian countries if we 
exclude natural resources, is dramatically growing. In 
this context, Turkey’s ability to act as a fully autono-
mous economic actor is curtailed by the CU’s bind-
ing provisions, which compell Turkey’s trade policy to 
attain to EU’s unilateral decisions. In this framework, 
Turkey’s wider interests run the risk to be subdued to 
a far rigid scheme. 
Furthermore, if we carefully look at the very reason ex-
plaining the establishment of a CU with the EU, name-
ly the prospect of full-fledged membership in the me-
dium-term, and even more carefully we read between 
the lines of EU political debate about Turkey’s acces-
sion, it is arguable that the mismatch among Turkey’s 
expectations, the commitment towards membership 
and the EU’s ambiguous behaviour is clearly deepen-
ing. More academic and public debate is needed in 
order to outline the changing nature of Turkey’s trade 
diversification and to evaluate the impact of keeping 
the CU up. Current arrangement appears too rigid and 
too less inclusive to match with Turkey’s economic 
dynamism. And without any serious evidence of an 
eventual membership, the CU long-term sustainabil-
ity could start to be put into question.
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